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1   Introduction 
If the main business of semantics is to explain how linguistic constructs relate to the 
world, then semantic analysis of natural language text is, indirectly, an attempt at 
uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense knowledge, and particularly the 
background knowledge that seems to be implicit in all that we say in our everyday 
discourse. While this intimate relationship between language and the world is 
generally accepted, semantics (in all its paradigms) has traditionally proceeded in one 
direction: by first stipulating an assumed set of ontological commitments followed by 
some machinery that is supposed to, somehow, model meanings in terms of that 
stipulated structure of reality. 
With the gross mismatch between the trivial ontological commitments of our 
semantic formalisms and the reality of the world these formalisms purport to 
represent, it is not surprising therefore that challenges in the semantics of natural 
language are rampant. However, as correctly observed in [7], semantics could become 
nearly trivial if it was grounded in an ontological structure that is, “isomorphic to the 
way we talk about the world”. The obvious question however is ‘how does one arrive 
at this ontological structure that implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday 
discourse?’ One plausible answer is the (seemingly circular) suggestion that the 
semantic analysis of natural language should itself be used to uncover this structure. 
In this regard we strongly agree with [4] who states: 
 
We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions first, and then construct 
a meaning-theory in light of the answers. We should investigate how our 
language actually functions, and how we can construct a workable systematic 
description of how it functions; the answers to those questions will then 
determine the answers to the metaphysical ones. 
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that in our effort to understand 
the complex and intimate relationship between ordinary language and everyday 
commonsense knowledge, one could, as also suggested in [2], “use language as a tool 
for uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense” since ordinary language is the 
best known theory we have of everyday knowledge. 
To avoid this seeming circularity (in wanting this ontological structure that would 
trivialize semantics; while at the same time suggesting that semantic analysis should 
itself be used as a guide to uncovering this ontological structure), we could start 
performing semantic analysis from the ground up, assuming a minimal (almost a 
trivial and basic) ontology, building up the ontology as we go guided by the results of 
the semantic analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) the ontology thus 
constructed as a result of this process would not be invented, as is the case in most 
approaches to ontology (e.g., [5], [8] and [13]), but would instead be discovered from 
what is in fact implicitly assumed in our use of language in everyday discourse; (ii) 
the semantics of several natural language phenomena should as a result become 
trivial, since the semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying knowledge 
structures (in a sense, the semantics would have been done before we even started!) 
In this paper we suggest exactly such an approach. In particular, in the rest of the 
paper we (i) argue that semantics must be grounded in a much richer ontological 
structure, one that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk 
about it in ordinary language; (ii) it will be demonstrated that in a logic ‘embedded’ 
with commonsense metaphysics the semantics of various natural language phenomena 
could become ‘nearly’ trivial; and (iii) we finally suggest some steps towards 
discovering (as opposed to inventing) the ontological structure that seems to 
implicitly underlie all that we say in ordinary language. 
2   Semantics with Ontological Content 
We begin by making a case for a semantics that is grounded in a strongly typed 
ontological structure that is isomorphic to our commonsense view of reality. In doing 
so, our ontological commitments will initially be minimal. In particular, we assume 
the existence of a subsumption hierarchy of a number of general categories such as 
animal, substance, entity, artifact, event, etc., and where the fact that 
an object of type human is also an entity, for example, is expressed as 
human entity . We shall use x( :: )animal  to state that x is an object of type 
animal, and Articulate x( :: )human  to state that the property Articulate is true of 
some object x, an object that must be of type human (since ‘articulate’ is a property 
that is ordinarily said of humans). We write x P x( :: )( ( ))∃ t  when the property P is 
true of some object x of type t; 1x P x( :: )( ( ))∃ t  when P is true of a unique object of 
type t; and ax P x( :: )( ( ))∃ t  when the property P is true of some object x of type t, an 
object that only conceptually (or abstractly) exists - i.e., an object that need not 
physically exist. Furthermore, we assume aQx P x Qx P x( :: )( ( )) ( :: )( ( ))⊃t t , where Q 
is one of the standard quantifiers ∀  and ∃ , i.e., what actually exists must also 
conceptually exist. Proper nouns, such as Sheba, are interpreted as 
1sheba P x Noo x sheba P x[( )( ( :: ,‘ ’) ( :: ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∧entity t  (1) 
where Noo x s( :: , )entity  is true of some individual object x (which could be any 
entity), and s if (the label) s is the name of x (to simplify notation we sometimes 
write (1) as 1sheba P x sheba P x[( :: )( ( :: ))]λ⇒ ∃ t ). Note now that a variable might, 
in a single scope, be associated with more than one type. For example, x in (1) is 
considered to be an entity and an object of type t, where t is presumably the type 
of objects that the property P applies to (or makes sense of). In these situations a type 
unification must occur. In particular, type unification occurs when some variable x is 
associated with more than one type in a single scope. A type unification ( )•s t , 
between two types s and t, where Q is one of the standard quantifiers ∀  and ∃  is 
defined as follows: 
a
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(2) 
As an initial example, consider the steps involved in the interpretation of ‘sheba is 
hungry’, where it will be assumed that ( )animal entity  and that Hungry is a 
property that applies to (or makes sense of) objects that are of type animal: 
sheba is hungry  
1sheba Hungry sheba( :: )( ( :: ))⇒ ∃ entity animal  
1sheba Hungry sheba( :: ( ))( ( ))⇒ ∃ •animal entity  
1sheba Hungry sheba( :: )( ( ))⇒ ∃ animal  
(3) 
Thus, ‘sheba is hungry’ states that there is a unique object named sheba, which must 
be an object of type animal, and such that sheba is hungry. Type unification will not 
always be as straightforward, as in general there could be more than two types 
associated with a variable in a single scope. Consider for example the interpretation of 
‘sheba is a young artist’, where Young is assumed to be a property that applies to  (or 
makes sense of) physical objects; and where it is assumed that Artist is a property 
that is ordinarily said of objects that are of type human: 
sheba is a young artist  
1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: )( ( :: ) ( :: ))⇒ ∃ ∧entity human physical  
(4) 
A pair of type unifications, must now occur: ( ( ))• •entity human physical , 
resulting in human. The final interpretation is thus given as follows: 
sheba is a young artist
 
1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: )( ( ) ( ))⇒ ∃ ∧human  
(5) 
In the final analysis, therefore, ‘sheba is a young artist’ is interpreted as follows: there 
is a unique object named sheba, an object that must be of type human, and such that 
sheba is Artist and Young. It should be noted here that not recognizing the ontological 
difference between human and Artist (namely, that what ontologically exist are 
objects of type human, and not artists, and that Artist is a mere property that may or 
may not apply to objects of type human) has traditionally led to ontologies rampant 
with multiple inheritance. Note, further, that in contrast with human, which is a first-
intension ontological concept (see [3] for a formal discussion on this issue), Artist and 
Young are considered to be second-intension logical concepts, namely properties that 
may or may not be true of first-intension (ontological) concepts. Moreover, and unlike 
first-intension ontological concepts (such as human), logical concepts such as Artist 
are assumed to be defined by virtue of logical expressions, such as 
dfx Artist x( :: )( ( ) )ϕ∀ ≡human , where the exact nature of ϕ  might very well be 
susceptible to temporal, cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on what, at a 
certain point in time, a certain community considers an Artist to be. That is, while the 
properties of being an Artist and Young that x exhibits are accidental (as well as 
temporal, cultural-dependent, etc.), the fact that some x is human (and thus an 
animal, etc.) is not1. 
3   More on Type Unification 
Thus far we performed simple type unifications involving types that are in a 
subsumption relationship. For example, we assumed ( )• =human entity human , 
since ( )human entity . Quite often, however, it is not subsumption but some 
other relationship that exists between the different types associated with a variable, 
and a typical example is the case of nominal compounds. Consider the following: 
a.  book review 
b.  book proposal  
c.  design review  
d.  design plan 
(6) 
From the standpoint of commonsense, the reference to a book review should 
imply the existence of a book, whereas the reference to a book proposal should 
be considered to be a reference to a proposal of some book, a book that might not 
(yet) actually exist. That is, 
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  In a recent argument Against Fantology [12] it was noted that too much attention has been paid to the 
false doctrine that much can be discovered about the ontological structure of reality by predication in 
first-order logic. In particular, it is argued in [12] that the use of standard predication in first-order logic 
in representing the meanings of ‘John is a human’ and ‘John is tall’, for example, completely ignores the 
different ontological categories implicit in each utterance. While we agree with this observation, we 
believe that our approach to a semantics grounded in an a rich ontological structure that is supposed to 
reflect our commonsense reality, does solve this problem without introducing ad-hoc relations to the 
formalism, as example (4) and subsequent examples in this paper demonstrate. First-order logic (and 
Frege, for that matter), are therefore not necessarily the villains, and the “predicates do not represent” 
slogan is perhaps appropriate, but it seems only when predicates are devoid of any ontological content. 
a book review P x y ReviewOf y x P y[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∃ ∧book review  
a book proposal P x y ProposalFor y x P y[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∃ ∧book proposal  
(7) 
 
(8) 
Finally, it must be noted that, in general, type unification might fail, and this occurs in 
the absence of any relationship between the types assigned to a variable in the same 
scope. For example, assuming Artificial x( :: )naturalObj , i.e., that Artificial is a 
property ordinarily said of objects of type naturalObj, and assuming 
( )car artifact , then ‘artificial car’ would get the interpretation 
an artificial car  
P x Artificial x[( :: )( ( :: ))]λ⇒ ∃ car naturalObj  
P x Artificial x[( :: ( ))( ( ))]λ⇒ ∃ •naturalObj car  
P x Artificial x[( :: )( ( ))]λ⇒ ∃ ⊥  
(9) 
It would seem therefore that type unification fails in the interpretation of some phrase 
that does not seem to be plausible from the standpoint of commonsense2. 
4   From Abstract to Actual Existence 
What we have been doing thus far can be summarized as follows: we have embedded 
commonsense into our semantics by annotating every quantified variable referred to 
in some predicate P with an ontological category that P applies to (or makes sense 
of), as per our everyday use of ordinary language. In this section it will be 
demonstrated how this mechanism, along with the notion of type unification, can 
explain how certain abstract entities that initially can only be assumed to conceptually 
exist, are, in an appropriate context, reduced to concrete spatio-temporal entities.  
Recall that our intention in associating types with quantified variables, as, for 
example, in Articulate x( :: )human , was to reflect our commonsense understanding 
of how the property Articulate is used in our everyday discourse, namely that 
Articulate is ordinarily said of objects that are of type human. What of a property such 
as Imminent, then? Undoubtedly, saying some object e is Imminent only makes sense 
in ordinary language when e is some event, which we have been expressing as 
Imminent e( :: )event . But there is obviously more that we can assume of e. In 
particular, imminent is said in ordinary language of some e when e is an event that has 
                                                          
2
  Interestingly, type unification and the embedding of ontological types into our semantics seems also 
promising in providing an explanation for the notion of metonymy in natural language. While we cannot 
get into this issue here in much details, we will simply consider the following example by way of 
illustration, where R is some salient relationship between a human and a hamSandwich: 
 
 the ham sandwich ordered a beer  
1
x y Ordered x y( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃hamSandwich beer human order  
1x y Ordered x y( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •hamSandwich human beer object  
1 1 az x y R x y Ordered x y( :: ))( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∃ ∃ ∧human hamSandwich beer  
 
 That is, saying ‘the ham sandwich ordered a beer’ essentially means (again, as far as commonsense is 
concerned) that some human, who stands in some relationship to a hamSandwich, ordered a beer. 
not yet occurred, that is, an event that exists only conceptually, which we write as 
aImminent e( :: )event . A question that arises now is this: what is the status of an 
event e that, at the same time, is imminent as well as important? Clearly, an important 
and imminent event should still be assumed to be an event that does not actually exist 
(as important as it may be). ‘Important’ must therefore be a property that is said of an 
event that also need not actually exist, as illustrated by the following: 
an important and imminent event  
a aP x Importnat x Imminent x P x[( )( ( :: ) ( :: ) ( :: ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∧ ∧abstract event t  
a aP x Importnat x Imminent x P x[( :: ( ))( ( ) ( ) ( :: ))]λ⇒ ∃ • ∧ ∧event abstract t  
aP x Importnat x Imminent x P x[( :: )( ( ) ( ) ( :: ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∧ ∧event t  
(10) 
It is important to note here that one can always ‘bring down’ an object (such as an 
event) from abstract existence into actual existence, but the reverse is not true. 
Consequently, quantification over variables associated with the type of an abstract 
concept, such as event, should always initially assume abstract existence. To 
illustrate, let us first assume the following: 
Attend x y( :: , :: )human event  
aCancel x y( :: , :: )human event  
(11) 
(12) 
That is, we have assumed that it always makes sense to speak of a human that 
attended or cancelled some event, where to attend an event is to have an existing 
event; and where the object of a cancellation is an event that does not (anymore, if it 
ever did) exist3. Consider now the following: 
john attended the seminar  
1 1 aj e Attended j e( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human seminar human event  
1 1 aj e Attended j e( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •human human seminar event  
1 1j e Attended j e( :: )( :: )( ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∃human seminar  
(13) 
That is, saying ‘john attended the seminar’ is saying there is a specific human named 
j, a specific seminar e (that actually exists) such that j attended e. On the other 
hand, consider now the interpretation of the sentence in (14). 
john cancelled the seminar  
1 1 a ajohn y Cancelled john y( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human seminar human event  
1 1 a ajohn y Cancelled john y( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •human human seminar event  
1 1 ajohn y Cancelled john y( :: )( :: )( ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∃human seminar  
(14) 
                                                          
3
  Tense and modal aspects can also effect the initial type assignments, although a full treatment of this 
issue would involve discussing the interaction with syntax in much more detail. 
What (14) states is that there is a specific human named john, and a specific 
seminar (that does not necessarily exist), a seminar that john cancelled4. An 
interesting case now occurs when a type is ‘brought down’ from abstract existence 
into actual existence. Let us assume aPlan x y( :: , :: )human event ; that is, that it 
always makes sense to say that some human is planning (or did plan) an event that 
need not (yet) actually exist. Consider now the following, 
john planned the trip  
1 1 a aj e Planned x y( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human trip human event  
1 1 a aj e Planned j e( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •human human trip event  
1 1 aj e Planned j e( :: )( :: )( ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∃human trip  
(15) 
That is, saying ‘john planned the trip’ is simply saying that a specific object that must 
be a human has planned a specific trip, a trip that might not have actually 
happened5. However, assuming Lengthy e( :: )event ; i.e., that Lengthy is a property 
that is ordinarily said of an (existing) event, then the interpretation of ‘john planned 
the lengthy trip’ should proceed as follows: 
john planned the lengthy trip  
1 1 a aj e Planned x y Lengthy e( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ) ( :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human trip human event event∧  
1 1 a aj e Planned j e Lengthy e( :: )( :: )( ( , :: ( )) ( ))⇒ ∃ ∃ •human trip event event ∧  
1 1 aj e Planned j e Lengthy e( :: )( :: ( ))( ( , ) ( ))⇒ ∃ ∃ •human trip event ∧  
1 1j e Planned j e Lengthy e( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))⇒ ∃ ∃human trip ∧  
(16) 
That is, there is a specific human (named john) that has planned a specific trip, a 
trip that was Lengthy. It should be noted here that the trip in (16) was finally 
considered to be an existing event due to other information contained in the same 
sentence. In general, however, this information can be contained in a larger discourse. 
For example, in interpreting ‘John planned the trip. It was lengthy’ the resolution of 
‘it’ would force a retraction of the types inferred in processing ‘John planned the 
trip’, as the information that follows will ‘bring down’ the aforementioned trip from 
abstract to actual existence. This subject is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but 
readers interested in the computational details of such processes are referred to [14]. 
5   On an Intensional Verbs and Dot (.) Objects 
Consider the following sentences and their corresponding translation into standard 
first-order logic: 
                                                          
4
  As correctly noted in [6], assuming that the reference to the seminar is intensional, i.e., that the reference 
is to ‘the idea of a seminar’ does not solve the problem since it is not the idea of a seminar that was 
cancelled, but an actual event that did not actually happen!   
5
  Note that it is the trip (event) that did not necessarily happen, not the planning (activity) for it.  
john found a unicorn x Unicorn x Found j x( )( ( ) ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∧  
john sought a unicorn x Unicorn x Sought j x( )( ( ) ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∧  
 
(18) 
(19) 
Note that x Elephant x( )( ( ))∃  can be inferred in both cases, although it is clear that 
‘john sought a unicorn’ should not entail the existence of a unicorn. In addressing this 
problem, [9] suggested a solution that in effect treats ‘seek’ as an intensional verb that 
has more or less the meaning of `tries to find', using the tools of a higher-order 
intensional logic. In addition to unnecessary complication of the logical form, 
however, we believe that this is, at best, a partial solution since the problem in our 
opinion is not necessarily in the verb seek, nor in the reference to unicorns. That is, 
painting, imagining, etc. of a unicorn (or an elephant, for that matter) should not 
entail the existence of a unicorn (nor the existence of an elephant). To illustrate 
further, let us first assume the following: 
Paint x y( :: , :: )human painting  
Find x y( :: , :: )human entity  
(20) 
(21) 
That is, we are assuming that it always makes sense to speak of a human that painted 
some painting, and of some human that found some entity. Consider now the 
interpretation in (22), where it was assumed that Large is a property that applies to (or 
makes sense of) objects that are of type physical. 
john found a large elephant  
1 john e( :: )( :: )⇒ ∃ ∃human elephant  
           Found j e Large e( ( :: , :: ) ( :: ))∧human entity physical  
1 john e( :: ( ))( :: ( ( )))⇒ ∃ • ∃ • •human human elephant entity physical  
           Found j e Large e( ( , ) ( ))∧  
1 john e Found j e Large e( :: )( :: )( ( , )) ( ))⇒ ∃ ∃ ∧human elephant  
(22) 
In the final analysis, therefore, if ‘john found a large elephant’ then there is a specific 
human (named j), and some elephant e, such that e is Large and j found e. 
However, consider now the interpretation in (23). 
john painted a large elephant  
1 john e( :: )( :: )⇒ ∃ ∃human elephant  
           Painted j e Large e( ( :: , :: ) ( :: ))∧human painting physical  
(23) 
Note that what we now have is a quantified variable, e, that is supposed to be an 
object of type elephant, an object that is described by a property, where it is 
considered to be an object of type physical, and an object that is in a relation in 
which it is considered to be a painting. There are two pairs of type unifications 
that must now occur, namely ( )•elephant painting  and ( )•elephant physical , 
where, if we recall the type unification definition given in (2), the former would result 
in making the reference to e abstract and in the introduction of a new variable of type 
painting. This process would in the final analysis result in the following: 
john painted a large elephant  
1 ajohn e p( :: )( :: )( :: )⇒ ∃ ∃ ∃human elephant painting  
           Painted j p PaintingOf p e Large e( ( , ) ( , ) ( ))∧ ∧  
(24) 
Note here that the interpretation correctly states that it is a (painted) elephant (that 
need not actually exist) that is Large and not the painting itself. Thus, ‘john painted a 
large elephant’ is correctly interpreted as roughly meaning ‘john made a painting of a 
large elephant’. 
In addition to handling the so-called intensional verbs, our approach seems to also 
appropriately handle other situations that, on the surface, seem to be addressing a 
different issue. For example, consider the following: 
john read the book and then he burned it. (25) 
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that ‘book’ in this context must have 
what is called a dot type, which is a complex structure that in a sense carries within it 
the semantic types associated with various senses of ‘book’. For instance, it is argued 
that ‘book’ in (25) carries the `informational content' sense (when it is being read) as 
well as the `physical object' sense (when it is being burned). Elaborate machinery is 
then introduced to ‘pick out’ the right sense in the right context, and all in a well-
typed compositional logic. 
But this approach presupposes that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of 
the word `book' in ordinary language6. Moreover, this approach does not seem to 
provide a solution for the problem posed by example (24), since there does not seem 
to be an obvious reason why a complex dot type for ‘elephant’ should contain a 
representational sense, although it is an object that can be painted. To see how this 
problem is dealt with in our approach, consider the following: 
Read x y( :: , :: )human content  
Burn x y( :: , :: )human physical  
(26) 
(27) 
That is, we are assuming here that it always makes sense to speak of a human that 
read some content, and of a human that burned some physical object. Consider 
now the following: 
john read a book  
1 j b Read j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human book human content  
1 j b Read j b( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •human human book content  
1 j b c ContentOf b c Read j b( :: )( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∃ ∃ ∧human book content  
(28) 
Thus, if ‘john read a book’ then there is some specific human (named j), some object 
b of type book, such that that j read the content of b. On the other hand, consider 
now the following: 
                                                          
6
  Similar presuppositions are also made in a hybrid (connectionist/symbolic) ‘sense modulation’ approach 
described by Rais-Ghasem and Corriveau (1998).  
john burned a book  
1 j b Burn j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human book human physical  
1 j b Burned j b( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •human human book physical  
1 j b Burned j b( :: )( :: )( ( , ))⇒ ∃ ∃human book  
(29) 
That is, if ‘john burned a book’ then there is some specific human (named j), some 
object b of type book, such that that j burned b. Note, therefore, that when the book 
is being burned we are simply referring to the book as the physical object that it is, 
while reading the book implies, implicitly, that we are referring to an additional 
(abstract) object, namely the content of the book. The important point we wish to 
make here is that there is one book object, an object that is (ultimately) a physical 
object, that one can read (its content), sell/trade/etc (as a commodity), etc., or 
burn (as is, i.e., as simply the physical object that it is!) Thus ‘book’ can be easily 
used in different ways in the same linguistic context, as illustrated by the following: 
john read a book and then he burned it  
1 j b Read j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: )⇒ ∃ ∃human book human content  
1 j b Burn j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))⇒ ∃ ∃human book human physical  
1 j b Burned j b( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))⇒ ∃ • ∃ •human human book physical  
            ContentOf b c Burn j b( , ) ( :: , :: ))∧ ∧ human physical  
(30) 
Like the example of ‘painting a large elephant’ discussed in (24) above, where the 
painting of an elephant implied its existence in some painting and it being large as 
some physical object (that need not actually exist), in (30) we also have a reference to 
a book as a physical object (that has been burned), and to a book that has 
content (that has been read). Similar to the process depicted in figure 1 above, the 
type unifications in (30) should now result in the following: 
john read a book and then he burned it  
1 j b c( :: )( :: )( :: )⇒ ∃ ∃ ∃human book content  
           ContentOf c b Read j c Burn j b( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))∧ ∧  
(31) 
That is, there is some unique object of type human (named j), some book b, some 
content c, such that c is the content of b, and such that j read c and burned b. As 
pointed out in a previous section, it should also be noted here that these type 
unifications are often retracted in the presence of additional information. For example, 
in ‘John borrowed Das Kapital from the library. He did not agree with it’ the 
resolution of `it' would eventually result in the introduction of an abstract content 
object (which one might not agree with), as one does not agree (or disagree) with a 
physical object, an object that can indeed be borrowed7. 
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  Interestingly, the resolution of ‘it’, in addition to introducing a content object, should result in Das 
Kapital, since one cannot agree or disagree with a library, but with the content of the library’s books.  
6   Towards Discovering the Structure of Commonsense Knowledge 
Throughout this paper we have tried to demonstrate that a number of challenges in the 
semantics of natural language can be easily tackled if semantics is grounded in a 
strongly-typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way 
we talk about it in ordinary language. Our ultimate goal, however, is the systematic 
discovery of this ontological structure, and, as also argued in [2], [4] and [11], it is the 
systematic investigation of how ordinary language is used in everyday discourse that 
will help us discover (as opposed to invent) the ontological structure that seems to 
underlie all what we say in our everyday discourse. Recall, for example, our 
suggestion of how a nominal compound such as ‘a book review’ is interpreted: 
  [( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∃ ∧book reviewa book review P x y ReviewOf y x P y  (31) 
Note that this analysis itself seems to shed some light on the nature of the ontological 
categories under consideration. For example, (31) seems to be an instance of a more 
generic template that can adequately represent the compositional meaning of a 
number of similar nominal compounds, as illustrated in (a) below. 
 
              
                     (a)                                                                     (b) 
 
Similarly, as suggested in (b) above, it seems that the semantic analysis of a nominal 
compound such as ‘brick house’, for example, suggests that a number of nominal 
compounds can be semantically analyzed according to the following template: 
 
  substance artifacta N N  
[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]λ⇒ ∃ ∃ ∧artifact substanceP x y MadeOf x y P x  
 
The general strategy we are advocating can therefore be summarized as follows: (i) 
we can start our semantic analysis by assuming a set of ontological categories that are 
embedded in the appropriate properties and relations (based on our use of ordinary 
language); (ii) further semantic analysis of some non-trivial phenomena (such as 
nominal compounds, intensional verbs, metonymy, etc.) should help us put some 
structure on the ontological categories assumed in step (i); and (iii) this additional 
structure is then iteratively used to repeat the entire process until, presumably, the 
nature of the ontological structure that seems to be implicit in everything we say on 
ordinary language is well understood. 
7   Concluding Remarks 
The thesis presented in this paper is the following: assuming the existence of an 
ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we 
talk about in ordinary language would make the semantics of various natural language 
phenomena nearly trivial. Although we could not, for lack of space, fully demonstrate 
the utility of our approach, recent results we have obtained suggest an adequate 
treatment of a number of phenomena, such as the semantics of nominal compounds, 
lexical ambiguity, and the resolution of quantifier scope ambiguities, to name a few. 
More importantly, it seems that a gradual imbedding of commonsense metaphysics in 
our semantic formalism is itself what will help us discover the nature of the 
ontological structure that seems to underlie all that we say in our every discourse. 
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